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FOREWORD
The recent history of the conversation with Russia over plans for European missile defense has been
one of repeated and unsuccessful attempts to allay
strongly worded Russian concerns. None of these attempts has mitigated Russia’s trenchant opposition to
U.S. plans. At times, this opposition can appear based
on grounds which are spurious or incomprehensible.
In this monograph, Mr. Keir Giles, a British academic and long-term scholar of Russia, examines the
history of missile defense, and the current dialogue,
from a Russian perspective in order to explain the root
causes of Russian alarm. He presents specific recommendations for managing the Russia relationship in
the context of missile defense. Important conclusions
are also drawn for the purpose of managing the dialogue over missile defense plans not only with Russia
as an opponent, but also with European North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies as partners and hosts.
The latter are especially significant in the light of these
partners’ heightened hard security concerns following
Russian annexation of Crimea and continuing hostile
moves against Ukraine.
This monograph was completed before the start
of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, but
already warned of the prospect of direct military action by Russia in Europe to protect Moscow’s selfperceived interests. Given the continuing hostility of
Russian messaging over U.S. missile defense plans,
the Strategic Studies Institute strongly recommends
this monograph to policymakers contributing not only
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to missile defense planning, but also to any aspect of
policy affecting the defense of Europe.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a
scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his
Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the
primary justification. Despite widespread and wellfounded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary
asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the
periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the
United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile
defense capability, stemming from a continued failure
to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and
Russian fears.
Russia’s vehement objections to U.S. plans for missile defense installations in Europe, and the range of
unfriendly actions promised in response, are often
portrayed as irrational, the arguments technically
flawed, the behavior deliberately obstructive, and the
underlying threat perception hopelessly out of date.
Yet an examination of the missile defense relationship between Russia and the United States over time
shows that the fundamental Russian concerns stem
from ideas of state security which, while discounted
elsewhere, remain valid in the Russian security calculus. The fundamentally different weight and importance attached by Russia to nuclear weapons as both
a guarantee and a symbol of statehood can be challenging for U.S. observers to grasp, but it is critical to
understanding those Russian statements that do not,
at first sight, make rational sense to U.S. policymakers. Furthermore, while the current Russian proposals
for compromise—at least those stated in public—are
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wholly unrealistic, bear in mind that some of the security considerations behind them, at various times, have
been both shared and voiced by the United States.
This monograph will examine the historical precedents for the current missile defense impasse, in order
to explain the Russian attitude, and draw conclusions
about both the most recent developments in the conversation between the United States and Russia and
its likely further progress and prospects, if any, for a
resolution.
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INTRODUCTION
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a
scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his
Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the
primary justification.1 Despite widespread and wellfounded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary
asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the
periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the
United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile
defense capability, stemming from a continued failure
to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and
Russian fears.
Russia’s vehement objections to U.S. plans for missile defense installations in Europe, and the range of
unfriendly actions promised in response, are often
portrayed as irrational, the arguments technically
flawed, the behavior deliberately obstructive, and the
underlying threat perception hopelessly out of date.2
Yet, an examination of the missile defense relationship between Russia and the United States over time
shows that the fundamental Russian concerns stem
from ideas of state security which, while discounted
elsewhere, remain valid in the Russian security calculus. The fundamentally different weight and importance attached by Russia to nuclear weapons as both
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a guarantee and a symbol of statehood can be challenging for U.S. observers to grasp, but it is critical to
understanding those Russian statements that do not,
at first sight, make rational sense to U.S. policymakers. Furthermore, while the current Russian proposals
for compromise—at least those stated in public—are
wholly unrealistic, bear in mind that some of the security considerations behind them, at various times, have
been both shared and voiced by the United States.
This monograph will examine the historical precedents for the current missile defense impasse in order
to explain the Russian attitude and draw conclusions
about both the most recent developments in the conversation between the United States and Russia, and
its likely further progress and prospects, if any, for a
resolution.
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN: MISSILE DEFENSE
IN THIS CENTURY AND THE LAST
Topical reporting on missile defense discussions
between Russia and the United States often gives the
impression that the issue is a new one, and has only
been a significant factor in the bilateral relationship
since the late-2000s and the announcement of the first
round of plans for U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.3 In fact, the
problem has a long history through various cycles of
missile defense initiatives by both the United States
and the Soviet Union over previous decades. Examining the history of missile defense systems on both
sides is instructive, since many arguments over their
strategic implications are repeated decades apart, and
there are precedents from Soviet times which reveal
an entirely consistent Russian approach to the prob-
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lem over time—as well as an inconsistent and unpredictable U.S. approach.
As expressed by Dmitry Medvedev during his
term as Russian president: “Russia’s relations with
the USA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in the missile defense area have a long and
complicated history.”4 This history needs to be considered from both the U.S. and Soviet sides, because
it helps provide a framework for understanding the
current Russian objections and points to likely future
developments in the Russian stance. It will also show
that some of the Russian objections to U.S. plans,
which are perceived as irrational by the current U.S.
leadership, in fact, precisely mirror U.S. statements
and attitudes from previous decades.
Early Days.
Interest in development of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system first arose in the United States during World War II, when observing the British experience of being subjected to ballistic missile attack from
Germany and considering the future implications for
the United States.5 BMD development accelerated in
the late-1950s, when successful Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches, combined with
aggressive Soviet expansionism, accentuated U.S. vulnerability. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962
highlighted the lack of available defensive measures
against missile attack—but the outcome of the crisis, and the resulting partial strategic setback for the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), caused the
Soviet Union to put greater emphasis on its own antimissile systems. Reports of the planned Soviet BMD
system, in turn, caused then-U.S. President Lyndon
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Johnson to authorize the Sentinel system, designed to
defend the U.S. homeland against a light missile attack, in September 1967.6 Thus the pattern was set for
the reactive, interdependent nature that U.S. and Russian missile defense plans have retained ever since.
President Richard Nixon refocused U.S. missile
defense so the Sentinel system would protect U.S. deterrent forces as opposed to the general population,
and the concept was developed into a layered defense
system and renamed Safeguard. At the same time, recognition on both sides of the destabilizing potential
of missile defense systems led to agreement that the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), beginning
in 1969, would include discussions on limiting missile defense. The result was the signing of the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972 by President
Nixon and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, simultaneously with an Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms limitations.7 The
implication that the offensive and the defensive are
inseparable in strategic stability is a theme that is still
relevant to Russian objections to U.S. missile defense
plans today, and will be discussed further.
The ABM Treaty limited the number of BMD sites
that each side could maintain; a 1974 protocol to the
treaty further reduced the sites on each side from two
to one.8 Of these two possible sites, only the Soviet
one was fully implemented. The U.S. Safeguard system was cancelled by Congress in 1975, because of
doubts over its effectiveness, vulnerability, and cost.
In addition, the state of interception technology at the
time dictated that the interceptor missiles should be
nuclear armed to ensure a kill. As explained by Finn-
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ish physicist and prominent defense researcher Stefan
Forss, this was to some extent self-defeating:
Exploding a nuclear-tipped interceptor in the upper
atmosphere creates plasma that radar waves are not
able to penetrate. Accordingly, the battle management
radar is likely to go ‘blind’ after the first interceptor
is used, and follow-on missiles cannot be engaged.
The BMD system is essentially reduced to a single
shot system.9

In addition, the implications of detonating friendly
nuclear missiles over U.S. population centers gave rise
to a degree of concern.10 The Soviet leadership, meanwhile, was unencumbered by democratic oversight
of its defense planning, and the USSR continued development and implementation of its nuclear-armed
A-35 BMD installations around Moscow, descendents
of which continue in service today. Thus, it can be argued that, although the aim of the ABM Treaty was to
maintain strategic stability, this aim was not achieved
due to the resulting imbalance of only one side, the
USSR, implementing BMD capability.11 The Soviet
Union, therefore, had cause to be entirely satisfied with
the ABM Treaty. This is significant when considering
both Russian objections to its eventual cancellation in
2002 and earlier Soviet responses to the next cycle in
the BMD game: Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Strategic Defense Initiative.
By the early-1980s, the United States had begun to
worry that the Soviets had achieved a first strike capability that would allow them to cripple U.S. strategic
forces and still maintain enough nuclear weapons to
destroy America’s cities. This situation led President
5

Ronald Reagan to place greater emphasis on developing missile defenses. In March 1983, Reagan gave
a speech that launched SDI and promised what was
widely quoted as “Star Wars” technology. Despite the
careful wording of the speech, and mention of consistency with U.S. obligations under the ABM Treaty, it
contained phrases that were deeply alarming to the
Soviet leadership, since the promise to “eliminate the
threat posed by nuclear weapons” by rendering them
“impotent and obsolete” implied that the Soviet deterrent threat would be neutralized, destroying the foundations of strategic stability as understood by both
sides at the time, and leaving the USSR vulnerable to
nuclear attack without the possibility of retaliation.12
According to then Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, who,
like his successor Vladimir Putin, had moved into a
leadership position from a role as head of the country’s intelligence organization, this deliberate destabilization was “not just irresponsible, [but] insane.”13
The Soviet response to SDI needs to be considered,
because it is a direct precursor to Russian responses to
current U.S. BMD plans. Three issues of serious concern to the Russian leadership today directly echo the
situation 30 years ago. First, the concern over the development of technology that eventually may limit the
effectiveness of the Russian nuclear deterrent, or indeed render it useless—as in 1983, the technology and
level of implementation is not currently a threat to the
Russian deterrent, but extensive future development
is promised by the U.S. side, with no stated limit on
the planned capability. Second, and related, nuclear
weapons held and still hold a very different place in
the security calculus, and indeed in the national identity, of the Soviet Union and Russia, rendering their
devaluation a much less desirable end result than it is
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for the United States and many other states. Finally,
Soviet efforts to ensure the maintenance of strategic
stability by investing even more heavily in defense
are widely credited with accelerating the economic
collapse of the Soviet Union and its subsequent disappearance as a state—an existential threat of which the
Russian leadership is acutely conscious, and keen not
to repeat.14 All these issues remain current and will
be considered further in subsequent discussion of the
current Russian stance on U.S. BMD plans.
Exit the USSR.
In late-1989, the administration of President George
H. Bush initiated a review of the SDI program as part
of a broader examination of U.S. strategic requirements for the “new world order” that was thought to
be emerging. Responding to the change in the nature
of the ballistic missile threat that was highlighted by
missile attacks on Israel during the Gulf war in 1990,
President Bush announced in 1991 that the Defense
Department was refocusing the SDI program from defense against a massive Soviet missile attack to greater
emphasis on intercepting limited strikes.
The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of that
year appeared to vindicate this shift in U.S. policy.
The United States and its allies pursued an energetic
program in the early-1990s to ensure that former Soviet nuclear capabilities were concentrated in Russian
hands rather than scattered across several newly independent republics. But thereafter, throughout the
rest of that decade and into the new millennium, in its
public statements, the United States largely ignored
the possibility of deliberate targeting by Russian nuclear capability and focused instead on proliferation of
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ballistic missiles to rogue nations and, potentially, terrorist organizations. U.S. missile defense technologies
and concepts were adapted to meet a new and growing threat: a possible limited conventional or nuclear
attack on U.S. territory by ballistic missiles from rogue
states or even nonstate actors. Guarding against this
eventuality continues to shape much of U.S. policy on
BMD today; but, crucially, it does so to a degree that
Moscow does not fully understand, since Russia does
not fully share this threat assessment.
Accompanying this shift in emphasis was the development of new interceptor technology, for the first
time making kinetic hit-to-kill capability a realistic
prospect instead of relying on warheads with either
nuclear or conventional explosives to achieve destruction by an explosion in proximity to the incoming missile. With this new capability, mid-flight interceptions
became possible, with much reduced concern over
collateral damage or environmental effects. While the
perceived benefits from the U.S. side were clear, the
development of more ecologically friendly interceptors was of limited comfort to Russia: the same technological improvements removed the nuclear singleshot problem and made BMD a credible option for the
United States.
During the same period, Russia moved almost
overnight from a comfortable position of strong conventional deterrence through the massive superiority
of troop numbers of the Soviet Army to a reliance on
nuclear missiles as the only effective deterrent, at strategic or other levels, which was available to the newly
emergent Russian Federation. According to President
Putin, speaking in 2006, the entire Russian army had to
be stripped of its combat-capable units and personnel
in order to mount the limited campaign in Chechnya
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at the end of 1994.15 Throughout the following decade,
Russian defense budgets continued a relative decline,
with funding priority going to the nuclear forces.
While perceived as being of limited relevance by the
United States and its allies, none of whom intended to
attack Russia, the Russian leadership believed these
nuclear forces constituted the last-ditch guarantee of
Russian sovereignty and protection of its fundamental interests. Furthermore, throughout the worst period of budgetary meltdown and economic implosion,
Russia continued investment in development of its
own anti-missile capabilities—albeit with apparently
limited results. These capabilities were seen as critical
to maintaining nuclear parity, and nuclear parity in
turn was seen as critical to guaranteeing Russian state
interests and, indeed, the continued existence of the
state itself.
Thus the situation throughout the late-1990s provides another example pertinent today. Russia not
only perceives itself to be vulnerable to military attack
from the United States due to a severe conventional
capability gap, but it also proceeds from an assessment
of this capability to include in its security planning the
possibility of such an attack taking place. This consideration can be either imperfectly understood or disregarded by sections of the U.S. policymaking community—and therefore Russian concerns are heightened
by U.S. actions that are, in fact, unrelated to Russia.
The pattern continues today that deterrent messages
from the United States, which are intended for a specific audience far away from Russia, are treated by the
Russians as “to whom it may concern,” triggering a
reaction that occasionally surprises the United States,
and particularly those sections of its leadership that
had forgotten Russia was there.
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The United States Pulls Out of the ABM Treaty.
From the Russian perspective, the situation after
2001 deteriorated still further. On December 13, 2001,
President George W. Bush gave Russia a 6-month notice of U.S. intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty
so that the United States could pursue development
of the program at that time known as National Missile Defense (NMD)— already under way, in potential
violation of U.S. treaty obligations. But despite the
significance of the withdrawal, which undermined
Russia’s entire concept of strategic stability, the official response from Russia was measured and muted,
in sharp contrast to the heated rhetoric that greeted
subsequent U.S. BMD initiatives. President Putin restricted himself to calling the withdrawal “mistaken”
and referred to Russian capabilities for overcoming
BMD systems in an almost conciliatory manner rather
than the threatening tone that similar statements took
on subsequently.16
The reasons behind this contrast need to be examined, as they may suggest means of attenuating hostile Russian reactions, and the transactional costs they
entail, in the future. First, this occurred at the peak of
strategic cooperation between the United States and
Russia following the September 11, 2011 (9/11) attacks:
cooperation that Bush referred to as “a new strategic
relationship that will last long beyond our individual
administrations, providing a foundation for peace
for the years to come.”17 Indeed, the U.S. withdrawal
from the treaty was one of the first indications to Putin that his faith in ongoing strategic partnership as
equals was misplaced. Second, Russia was involved in
high-level discussions with the United States over the
future of the treaty from the earliest stages, avoiding
the complaints heard later from Moscow that, instead
10

of consulting beforehand, the United States developed
the habit of presenting faits accomplis.18 Finally, this
culminated in personal bilateral negotiations at the
presidential level: according to Bush, the issues were
“discussed with my friend, President Vladimir Putin,
over the course of many meetings, many months.”19
This direct engagement at the most senior level—the
only one that matters in Russian decisionmaking culture—is also of significance today and will also be referred to later in this monograph.
Subsequently, Bush re-emphasized a strong commitment to missile defense deployment. The missile
defense program was reoriented to focus on an integrated, layered defense that would be capable of attacking warheads and missiles in all phases of flight
and, eventually, of providing global defenses against
missiles of all ranges. As part of this program, the Bush
administration started planning for a European missile defense site to intercept ballistic missiles launched
from the Middle East.
Poland and Czech Republic—Round One.
Russian alarm at U.S. BMD plans mounted steadily from the mid-2000s20 as the United States moved
closer to implementing a Third Site for missile defense
in Europe, eventually intended to comprise a groundbased interceptor (GBI) anti-missile system in Poland
and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.
A growing realization of what U.S. renunciation
of the ABM Treaty meant in practice led to strenuous
and heated Russian opposition to these plans. U.S. efforts to address Russian arguments were not recognized by Moscow as engaging with the fundamental
Russian concerns, leading to a spiral of rhetoric from
Russian commentators and leaders describing the
11

Third Site in terms which were barely recognizable to
its planners—but that all remain, 6 or more years later,
current Russian objections to U.S. BMD plans overall.
The themes highlighted in the following text have
remained consistent in Russian discourse since 2007,
regardless of developments in U.S. plans since then.
Russian Views on the Third Site.21
BMD is aimed against no other target than Russia.
It is already clear that a new phase in the arms race is unfolding in the world. Unfortunately, it does not depend
on us, it is not us who are starting it.
President Putin,
February 8, 2008
The problem with possible deployment of ABM elements
in Poland and the Czech Republic is that it will not, in
our specialists’ opinion, have any other goal but monitoring Russia’s strategic potential. That is where our harsh
response stems from.
Head of Foreign Ministry
Department for Pan-European
Cooperation, Sergey Ryabkov,
January 23, 2008
At the same time, if the third positioning area is created,
a radar in the Czech Republic will be monitoring Russian
territory up to the Urals and interceptor missiles which
are planned to be stationed in Poland will be capable of
posing a threat to Russian deterrent arsenal. Therefore,
this area—when we are told that it is not aimed at Russia,
we should proceed not from intentions, but from facts,
real potentials.
Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov,
February 12, 2008
12

All this is being done solely in order to deprive Russia
of a guaranteed retaliatory strike capability in the event
of a nuclear conflict. A guaranteed retaliatory strike has
formed the basis of our security strategy since Soviet
times, and ensuring this security represents the main and
unconditional priority of our military doctrine.
With minimal outlays. the Americans have succeeded
not only in ensuring their military presence in Central
and Eastern Europe but also in compelling Russia to proceed with its own rearmament at a faster pace than anticipated. Once again, we have been drawn into an arms
race via a re-enactment of the scenario of the late-1980s,
that brought success for the Americans and constituted
one of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR.
Maksim Agarkov, military commentator,
				
October 22, 2007
The priorities of military threats . . . appear to stem above
all from US military policy, particularly the National Security Strategy it is implementing, which represents the
chief danger to world and Russian security.
			

Colonel Vladimir Lutovinov,
Academy of Military Sciences,
June 13, 2007

Dangerous Destabilization.
They decided to deploy defence infrastructure right on
our borders. . . . I recall how things went in a similar
situation in the mid-1960s. Similar actions by the Soviet
Union, when it put missiles in Cuba, precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis. For us, the technical aspects of the situation are very similar. We have removed the remnants
of our bases from Vietnam and dismantled them in Cuba,
yet threats of this kind to our own country are today being created right on our borders.
President Putin,
October 26, 2007
13

We will be forced to take appropriate measures of counteraction. . . . Notice that we are being forced into it. And
the new round of the arms race instigated by the USA
will hardly strengthen the security of the world, including the security of Europe.
Chief of General Staff
Yuriy Baluyevskiy,
July 17, 2007
It is most likely that in the foreseeable future, we will
hear talk about hundreds and even thousands of interceptor missiles in various parts of the world, including
Europe. Poland is just the thin end of the wedge. . . . Just
look at the map and you can see clearly that all this is being done along the perimeter of our borders.
One needs to be very naive to believe that the U.S. missile
defence base in Europe is directed away from Russia.
Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov,
February 8, 2008
The initiatives of fresh NATO members, like Poland and
the Czech Republic, to host elements of the global U.S.
missile and air defence system will give the Pentagon a
potential to defeat our strategic nuclear forces. . . . This
means a serious threat to the military [security], and as a
result to the national security of Russia, and could lead to
the disruption of strategic stability in the world.
Colonel-General Boris Cheltsov,
Chief of Staff of the RussianAir Force,
March 14, 2007

Need for Legal Guarantees.
We are forced to take relevant steps which will under no
circumstances allow for the Russian nuclear deterrent
potential to be devalued. . . .
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Had the Americans signed a treaty with us under which
they would only deploy 10 antimissiles in Poland and
one radar in the Czech Republic and would never deploy
anything else there, one could agree to that. But they do
not sign anything and only make unsubstantiated statements to the effect that they do not threaten us… Russia
has already been cheated like that once before.
Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN)
CommanderColonel-General
Nikolay Solovtsov, December 17, 2007
When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and US Defence Secretary Robert Gates were in Moscow [in October
2007], they spoke about a whole range of possible steps
on the part of the United States which were proposed as a
sort of a guarantee that the US ABM system is not aimed
against Russian interests. . . .
We asked to have those ‘intentions’ in writing, that is in
the form of a simple and clear proposal which the USA
would be prepared to put forward in practical terms. We
waited for almost 6 weeks. That must have been how
long it takes inside the US administration to agree a specific wording and, possibly, to hold additional talks with
partners. However, what we saw as a result was devoid
of those elements.
Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergey Kislyak,
February 5, 2008
Accepting the [Rice-Gates] offer would be like digging
our own grave.
			

Vremya Novostey newspaper,
April 24, 2007
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We Will Respond.
A potential threat in this regard does exist for us. And
of course, we, as our President and other officials of the
Russian Federation have already said more than once,
will be forced to take appropriate action to neutralise
these threats.
Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov,
October 15, 2007
Our General Staff and experts believe that this system
threatens our national security, and if it does appear, we
will be forced to respond in an appropriate manner. We
will then probably be forced to retarget some of our missile systems at these systems, which threaten us. . . . We
are warning them in advance that if you take this step,
we will be forced to respond in a particular way . . . I
believe that I am obliged to say this today directly and
honestly, so that later they do not blame themselves for
events they themselves will be responsible for.
President Putin,
February 14, 2008
I would like to remind my Polish colleagues of their
recent history, which indicates that attempts to situate
Poland on the line of confrontation have always led to
tragedy. In that way Poland lost nearly one-third of its
population during WWII.
Russia’s representative to NATO,
Dmitry Rogozin,
February 3, 2008
The responses might be many, and they will all be less
expensive than the US actions.
Chief of General Staff
Yuriy Baluyevskiy,
May 8, 2007

16

Meanwhile, the governments of both Poland and
the Czech Republic invested considerable political
capital in agreeing to host the U.S. sites in the face of
domestic opposition encouraged by vociferous and
threatening Russian campaigning. During a tense
period immediately following the armed conflict in
Georgia in August 2008, then U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice travelled to Warsaw to sign an
agreement on construction of the interceptor site,
leading to comment in U.S. media at the time that:
For many Poles—whose country has been a staunch
U.S. ally—the accord represented what they believed
would be a guarantee of safety for themselves in the
face of a newly assertive Russia.22

In July 2009, a group of Central Europe’s most
recognized former leaders and public figures wrote
an open letter to President Barack Obama highlighting missile defense as a symbol of U.S. commitment
to Europe and resistance to Russian hostile pressure.23
Thus when plans for the Third Site BMD installations
were cancelled, the immediate reaction was excited
relief in Russia and dismay in Central Europe. The announcement of a planned alternative capability was
entirely overshadowed by news of the cancellation
of the planned radar and GBI site. This was therefore
presented by some media as a strategic retreat, or a
concession to Russia,24 which put pressure on relations with both Poland and the Czech Republic.25 In
the case of Poland, an initial sense of betrayal to Russia was heightened by peculiarly insensitive timing;
the announcement was made on September 17, 2009,
precisely the 70th anniversary of the 1939 invasion of
Poland by the Soviet Union.
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Russia briefly celebrated a perceived victory over
the cancellation of plans for installations in Poland
and the Czech Republic—and, by implication, the
surrender of those countries’ interests by the U.S. as
a result of Russian pressure.26 The subsequent realization that cancellation of the Third Site was merely in
favor of deployment of different capabilities under the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) inadvertently reinforced a number of key U.S. messages
to Russia: first, announcement of a “cancellation” of
an undesirable program is not always good news;
second, U.S. plans are subject to radical, sudden and
unpredictable change, and not always for the better;
and third, as a result, it pays to wait and see before
welcoming any new U.S. initiative. These changes fuel
Russian distrust in U.S. promises and reinforce Russian arguments that U.S. missile defense capabilities
in the future can have very different capabilities than
what is currently claimed.
The Current State of EPAA.
Background.
On September 17, 2009, the same day as the Third
Site cancellation was made public, President Barack
Obama quietly announced a new plan for missile
defense, creating the EPAA. The new phased adaptive approach deploys U.S. upper tier sea- and landbased missile defenses in Europe in four phases
to supplement NATO lower tier systems as shortand longer-range missile threats from the Middle
East proliferate.
The “adaptive” part of the program’s title is not an
accident, but rather used to show that the missile de-
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fense program moving forward will adapt to the ever
increasing ballistic missile threat capability but still be
able to protect U.S. forces abroad and NATO allies.
President Obama stated:
To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture
in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter
defenses of American forces and America’s Allies. It
is more comprehensive than the previous program; it
deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective;
and it sustains and builds upon our commitment to
protect the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic
missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of all our NATO Allies.27

This plan calls for the establishment of a fully operational ballistic missile defense system in Europe
by 2018, which involved four phases at the time. The
first phase consisted of an early warning radar established in Turkey, and BMD-capable AEGIS cruisers,
complete with the Standard Missile (SM) 3 Block IA
medium-range ballistic missile interceptor. U.S. and
NATO allies announced initial capability of European
missile defense at the May 2012 NATO Summit, much
to Russia’s chagrin and frustration.
Phase II involves establishment of a land-based
SM-3 ballistic missile interceptor site in Romania by
2015, equipped with the more capable SM-3 Block IB
able to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. According to Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA)
Director for International Affairs Nancy Morgan,
Phase II broke ground in Romania in September 2013
and will be the first land-based site in Europe. Phase
III involves the second and last land-based SM-3 ballistic missile interceptor site in Europe, slated to be
operational in Redizkowo, Poland, by 2018, equipped
with the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.
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In March 2013, the United States announced the
cancellation of EPAA Phase IV, which hinged on introduction of the SM-3 IIB, the technology for which
has not yet developed. The SM-3 IIB program was
experiencing extended delays, in part due to underfunding and over-ambitious technical aspirations, so
the United States decided to place additional interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska, home of an existing missile
defense site in order to protect the U.S. homeland. U.S.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also announced the
number of interceptors will increase from 30 to 44.
Hagel also announced plans for extending missile
defense plans into Asia, deploying an additional AN/
TPY-2 radar in Japan, and called for a possible additional missile defense site in the United States, though
he was clear that the decision on deploying the additional site has not been made officially by the Obama
administration, but only that studies exploring an additional GBI site would expedite deploying the site,
should the decision be made.
Russia’s Sectoral Defence Proposal.
Once the planned development phases of EPAA
became clear, the Russian objections to BMD resurfaced in full force. The third and fourth stages, intended to counteract longer-range ballistic missiles,
were described as a threat to Russian deterrence potential.28 Meanwhile, the area of coverage of the defensive systems was perceived as threatening to Russia. According to then Russian ambassador to NATO
Dmitry Rogozin:
When the U.S. missile defence map in Europe is drawn
for us as an illustration, it turns out that towards the
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third and the fourth phases, that is towards 2018 and
2020, the U.S. missile defence sector almost reaches
Russia’s Urals. This is not what we have agreed on.29

Rogozin went on to say that:
Our partners need to understand that if they want
to guarantee their own security, they have their own
zone of responsibility. They can do anything they
want there, but they should not creep towards us.
They should not have the opportunity for their missile
defence weapons to shoot down any ballistic targets
over our territory, or over third countries.30

The solution proposed by Russia was so-called
“sectoral defense,” or the “sectoral approach,” where
Russia would ensure protection against missile
threats over its own territory, while the United States
provided protection for NATO nations. This option,
while consistently put forward by Russia as a credible
solution that provides for the workable defense of Europe against missiles while addressing Russia’s core
objections to U.S. plans, was patently unrealistic for
several reasons.
•	The objection to missiles being shot down by
the United States over Russia—“We’ve already
had Chernobyl and that was enough for us”31—
would seem to rule out the whole basis of the
Russian proposal, where Russia shoots down
those missiles with the nuclear-based missile
defense system currently in place in the Russian Federation.32
•	Progress in discussing the division of responsibility would never have been possible without much greater Russian transparency over
precisely what the Russian Federation could
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contribute in terms of future missile defense
capability to make its own contribution viable.
Despite the pains taken by the United States to
explain its plans to the Russian side, including
by means of direct briefings, this effort has not
at any time been reciprocated in a meaningful
manner. This may simply be because Russia
does not have the capability to meet its commitments implied in the proposals. According
to one informed view, “generally, there is a lack
of information and transparency from the Russian side about its missile defense plans (either
the Russians don’t have plans or they are unwilling to share them).”33
•	Finally, the basic principle of the sectoral approach —that Russia on the one side and the
U.S./NATO nations on the other do not provide missile defense coverage for the other’s
territory—is unworkable because of simple
geographical facts. Russian and NATO territory not only fail to follow neat and straight
dividing lines, but in fact overlap thanks to Kaliningrad Oblast sitting on the far side of Latvia
and Lithuania from the Russian mainland.
The implication of the last point was that Russia
should take missile defense responsibility for some
NATO member states. Russia was therefore proposing that NATO should outsource part of its protection
to Russia, while at the same time refusing to consider
a reciprocal arrangement.34 The Russian proposal for
sectoral missile defense was officially abandoned in
mid-July 2011,35 and yet, it still occasionally reappears
in Russian official statements.36
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Lisbon and Afterwards.
NATO presented its Lisbon Summit in November 2010 as a breakthrough in strategic cooperation
between Russia and NATO. In fact, however, this
marked the beginning of even greater disappointments for Russia over the progress of BMD provision
for Europe. At Lisbon, the United States and NATO
agreed to integrate existing NATO member BMD capabilities, with EPAA forming the U.S. contribution.37
Meanwhile, the concurrent NATO-Russia Council
Summit capitalized on the slow stabilization of relations between Russia and NATO after the Georgia
war by declaring “a new stage of cooperation towards
a true strategic partnership,” including exploring cooperation on missile defense.38
Moscow remained optimistic during the period
immediately following Lisbon for a breakthrough in
the United States, or indeed NATO, recognizing and
taking into account Russian interests—since this was
the Russian understanding of what had been promised at the summit.39 But this optimism faded rapidly,
as Russia saw the United States pushing ahead with
plans for EPAA, apparently untroubled by Russian
concerns, and with no options for cooperation emerging from the summit. As a result, Russian objections
to missile defense plans once again increased in both
volume and pitch ahead of a meeting of permanent
representatives on the NATO-Russia Council in early
July 2011, held in Sochi, Russia, with senior Russian
officials, including Foreign Minister Lavrov and Medvedev in attendance.40 The Sochi meeting was seen in
advance as:
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a good opportunity to take stock of the implementation of decisions taken in Lisbon—where we are in
contributing to the implementation of a single space
of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic
area—where we are, what the state of play is, what
should be done.41

Predictably enough, assessments of whether or not
this stocktaking was at all productive for BMD discussions varied widely. There was a marked contrast in
the tone of the headlines of reports from the meeting—
from Russian, “NATO and Russia in deadlock over
missile defense,”42 to German, “Russia warns NATO
over missile defense shield plans,”43 to independent,
“Russia-NATO Relations Stuck on Missile Defense,”44
to NATO’s own very distinctive headline—“NATORussia Council makes progress in Sochi.”45 It should
be no surprise that open source reporting on such a
contentious issue as BMD is in effect unrecognizable
between different sources and countries, reinforcing
the need to examine Russian coverage in detail in order to achieve an accurate understanding of both sides
of the conversation.
Thus, by the end of 2011, despite what Russia
had understood as commitments from Lisbon a year
earlier, Moscow saw the United States and NATO
ready to declare Phase I of EPAA operational and on
schedule and hope for any agreement on cooperation
on missile defense receded rapidly.46 Moscow’s disillusionment in negotiations with the United States and
NATO over BMD was made clear in a speech by thenPresident Medvedev on November 23, 2011, where
he stated, “We find ourselves facing a fait accompli.”47
Offers of cooperation by the United States and NATO
were deemed insufficient. For example, according to
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
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NATO had attempted to allay Russian concerns by
offering transparency on missile defense programs
through exchanges at the NATO-Russia Council and
issued “a standing invitation to Russian experts to observe and analyze missile defense tests.” Rasmussen
wrote that NATO also proposed holding joint NATORussian theater missile defense exercises and suggested establishing two joint missile defense centers, one
for sharing data and the other for supporting planning.48 Russia rejected these proposals as insufficient.49
Nevertheless, NATO officials stated as recently as
June 2013 that “these options are still on the table.”50
“LEGAL GUARANTEES” AND TECHNICAL
ARGUMENTS
When the entire history of U.S. BMD plans is reviewed from the Russian perspective, some consistent
themes emerge. The history is one of change, inconsistency, and unpredictability, where the United States
does not act as a reliable interlocutor. Even when
changes are made that appear at first sight to fall in
with Russian demands, such as Third Site cancellation, this can mask the development of even more
undesirable plans. This sheds light on Russia’s discounting of assurances that U.S. BMD plans will not,
and are not intended to, challenge Russia’s deterrent
potential and Russia’s consequent repeated demands
for “legally binding guarantees” that this is the case.
There is no shortage of statements on record by
both U.S. and NATO officials that Russia is not the target of European BMD plans and that the intention is
not to undermine strategic stability.51 Unfortunately,
saying so does not make it so in Russian eyes. Washington and NATO have offered political guarantees of

25

good faith to Moscow during several rounds of negotiations, but history has shown Moscow that with every U.S. presidential administration, the focus, goals,
and momentum of the U.S. missile defense system
change. In this light, it becomes less of a surprise that
Moscow gives little weight to U.S. assurances over
BMD—since it sees the United States doing the same.
Russia therefore asks for a more binding commitment
from the United States.
Speaking in 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov explained this as follows:
We propose agreeing on guarantees that the future
[EPAA] system will not be aimed against Russia. . . .
we propose agreeing on criteria to verify in practice
that the stated purpose of the project—namely, to
ward off missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region—will actually be observed. The Americans
are not yet ready for that; they give assurances that
there are no plans to aim this system against Russia.
But they refer to the fact that the Senate has forbade
the administration to limit the future development
of missile defence in any way—in other words, there
may be a fifth, sixth, seventh, etc. phase, which also
does not add much to predictability.
Our position is simple: if you say that the system is not
aimed against Russia, why not put it on paper?52

The U.S. refusal (and indeed political inability) to
give binding commitments on limitations to the capability of BMD systems is accompanied by a wealth
of expert opinion pointing out that the “legal guarantees” would be inappropriate and unworkable. Samuel Charap of the International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS) notes that the United States is, in effect,
being called on to give guarantees that Russia should
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be allowed to annihilate it at will,53 while leading disarmament and arms control specialist Paul Schulte
notes the probable ineffectiveness of legal agreements
constraining “a state interested in the thermo-nuclear
incineration of millions of your citizens.”54 Informed
commentary within Russia also notes difficulties with
the demand. According to Aleksey Arbatov, leading
commentator and head of the Centre for International
Security of the Institute for International Economy and
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “Russia is demanding some sort of legal guarantees, but is not saying exactly what type of guarantees. If Russia wants a new treaty limiting missile
defence, the USA and NATO will not do it.” Furthermore, Arbatov writes, the guarantees are entirely onesided: Russia has no intention of giving anyone any
guarantees regarding its own planned air and space
defence system; “on the contrary, we openly say that
this system is aimed against the USA and NATO.”55
As noted by Aleksandr Stukalin in the respected Moscow Defense Brief quarterly:
the notion of unilateral ‘legally binding guarantees’
seems to be a curious new invention by the Russian
negotiators, since there are no historical precedents of
such guarantees . . . how exactly are the ‘guarantees’
demanded by Russia supposed to work?56

The impossibility for the U.S. side of subscribing
to any restriction on missile defense plans that would
require Senate ratification57 is an obstacle fully recognized and understood by Russia. Finally, even legal
guarantees are suspect—treaty obligations, like those
contained in the ABM Treaty, can be, and indeed have
been, renounced. But the fact that Russia’s demands
are unworkable does nothing to reduce the “intensity
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and repetitiveness” of Russian insistence on its understanding of international law and on the necessity
for “legally-binding agreements.”58 This is entirely
consistent with calls for treaty arrangements in other
and broader areas of concern to Moscow, such as the
persistent Russian push for a new “European Security Treaty,” and it should be expected to remain an
underlying theme of Russian demands in future.
Technical Issues.
Russia’s objections to U.S. missile defense systems
in Europe hinge on the assumption that, at some future stage in their development, they will be capable
of reducing the effectiveness of strategic missiles
launched from Russia. The technological capabilities
of currently deployed systems are less alarming than
what was promised for the future under Phases III
and IV of EPAA, and it is against threatening future
developments that Russia has consistently sought
protective guarantees.
Independent critics claim BMD technologies overall remain mostly unproven to date, often run behind
schedule, have significant cost overruns, and would
have limited ability to defend against an actual ballistic missile attack.59 But Russian officials note that
once any technology is fielded, the United States can
decide at any time to increase the number of deployed
interceptors or modify existing equipment with more
advanced software and hardware.
Despite the unified and dogmatic position officially presented by Russia that EPAA poses a threat to
Russian deterrence, technical debates do take place in
Russia between responsible and informed individuals,
arriving at a range of different conclusions about the
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real implications for Russia of missile defense plans.60
Highly qualified Russian experts do disagree with the
official Russian line. Colonel-General (Retired) Viktor Yesin, formerly Chief of Staff of Russia’s Strategic
Missile Forces, does so regularly in Russian sources,
including in those media that would normally imply
official blessing.61 Similarly, Major-General (Retired)
Vladimir Dvorkin, also formerly of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces and credited with significant contributions to formulating Soviet and Russian positions at
strategic arms control negotiations, consistently puts
forward reasoned arguments that cast doubt on Russian official claims for the efficacy and intended target
of EPAA.62 According to Yury Solomonov, chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology
(Russia’s premier strategic missile design bureau), “In
most cases—and I’m saying this absolutely officially
and taking responsibility—the threat to our strategic
potential has simply been invented.”63
Knowledgeable individuals from both the United
States and Russia have put forward technical arguments outlining precisely at which point U.S. missiles
would, in theory, be capable of intercepting Russian
ICBMs. As might be expected, given that the arguments rest on commonly accepted laws of physics,
there is a degree of congruence between independent
assessments from Russia and from the United States.
For example, the conclusions reached by Yesin, cited
earlier, with Major-General Yevgeniy Savostyanov in
April 201264 are broadly similar to those of Yousaf Butt
and Theodore Postol in a Federation of American Scientists report in September 2011.65 Both agree that, on a
purely technical basis, U.S. BMD plans pose little or no
threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability—especially given the location of fixed Russian missile bases
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and the Russian ability to use countermeasures—and
this assessment has only been strengthened by the
cancellation of the SM3 Block IIB missile, whose likely
capabilities were used for the worst case assessments.
On this basis, it could reasonably be hoped that
Russia and the United States could reach baseline
agreements on the precise point in BMD technology
development at which Russia has legitimate cause for
concern—especially given repeated bilateral expert
consultations, including at the Moscow conference on
missile defense in May 2012.66 But even if technical discussion behind closed doors can reach agreement on
immutable physical realities, Russia apparently does
not find this possible in public debate, even at those
presentations where Russia is seeking through graphics and modeling to demonstrate the exact impact of
BMD on Russian deterrence. At one such demonstration held at the Russian Embassy in London in June
2012, the technical assumptions behind the modeled
successful intercepts of Russian missiles were questioned from the audience; rather than defending or
explaining the simulation, the Russian response was
simply that the “probability of interception depends
on factors we will not discuss here.”67 Similarly, when
asked to reconcile Russia’s official position with the
views of acknowledged Russian subject matter experts
such as Dvorkin, Russia’s Deputy Head of Mission to
NATO was brusque:
There are a lot of experts expressing their personal
views on things. Every expert has the right to express
his own views. . . . That is an opinion of a man [Dvorkin] who as far as I know retired some time ago.68

This failure to engage with challenges to Russian
statements strongly reinforces the view that the Rus30

sian objections to BMD are, in fact, insubstantial and
have no basis in any realistic technical capability to
challenge Russian deterrence. However, the majority of the experts cited earlier also agreed that strict
technical capabilities are not the only criterion for determining whether the planned EPAA Phase IV was
destabilizing and a threat to Russia, and a range of political, historical, and other factors are in play. This became abundantly clear when Phase IV was cancelled
in March 2013.
EPAA PHASE IV CANCELLED
There was widespread expectation in the United
States and its allies that the decision to cancel EPAA
Phase IV would be welcomed with appreciation by
Russia, as at first sight this removed many of the Russian objections to the planned development of EPAA.
As put by Yesin, “The decision not to place SM-3 missiles with increased combat capabilities [Block IIB] in
Europe . . . will eliminate the main irritant for Russia.”69 Instead, the initial reaction from Moscow was a
studied silence.
Following the 2009 experience of Third Site cancellation, Russia no doubt wished to avoid premature
expressions of enthusiasm. But there were other, more
significant reasons for the subdued response. In private discussions, Russian officials noted that the reaction to cancellation of EPAA Phase 4 was skeptical
because of the overall situation and broader context in
which it was made: the stated reasons for the cancellation were nothing to do with Russia, the decision was
presented by the United States as the program being
“restructured” on technical grounds, rather than cancelled, giving no guarantee that it would not return
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at a later date; and crucially, the development suggested that other future changes of plan and direction
are likely.70
As noted earlier, “adaptive” is a key word in the
title of the EPAA program. But according to First Secretary of Russia’s Mission to NATO Sergei Malyugin,
speaking at the 2013 Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI) Missile Defence Conference, “The adaptive approach is a little too adaptive.” What from the U.S. side
looks like flexibility to develop in accordance with an
evolving threat seems inconsistent, unpredictable, and
therefore destabilizing to Russia. Changes like these
do not instill confidence in U.S. assurances and lend
weight to Russia’s perceived need for legally binding
guarantees, such as a formal treaty. Thus while the
eventual Russian response to Hagel’s announcement
was “cautiously optimistic,” it was also careful to
state that while the move is appreciated, the cancellation does not change Russian concerns that European
BMD systems may eventually target Russia.71
What the U.S. cancellation of phase IV has seemed
to accelerate was Russian interest in returning to negotiations with the United States over missile defense
in Europe. Only now, Russia no longer views missile
defense as only a European security issue—now Russia views missile defense as worldwide and is increasingly concerned about U.S. expansion—primarily U.S.
missile defense sites surrounding Russia from both the
East and West. In the same vein, Moscow increasingly
relays to Washington that Moscow is growing less interested in bilateral missile defense talks and wants
to include other nations with missile defense interests
into the fold of discussions—namely China. This will
undoubtedly make future missile defense discussions
difficult for U.S. policymakers.72
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This issue appears closely aligned with the U.S.
“pivot” to the East and how Russia is accounting for
that pivot in its own security calculus, including potentially becoming more involved in Asia and aligning more closely with China on missile defense. It is at
present unclear to what extent Russia recognizes that
the need for missile defense capability is more pressing in Northeast Asia than in Europe,73 but Asia features much less prominently in Moscow’s anti-BMD
campaign, arguably in part because Russian influence
on and interest in countries threatened by North Korean weapons is much less than in Central Europe.
A further complicating factor for future negotiation
is the Russian desire to fold missile defense dialogue
into all areas of arms control discussion, including
on conventional arms control in Europe and further
nuclear reductions. According to Nikolai Korchunov:
Missile defence is only one element of security which
is more and more intertwined, and is being influenced
by a number of inter-related and interconnected factors. It is really difficult to analyse security only from
the stand-point of missile defence without taking into
account conventional arms, the Prompt Global Strike
concept and the threat of the weaponisation of outer
space. The failure to reach a compromise on missile
defence could also complicate the future prospects of
the disarmament process.74

Thus the missile defense issue is being raised in
response to a number of different topics, including the
proposal to Russia by the Obama administration for
negotiations on both conventional weapons control
and further reductions in nuclear arms beyond New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).75 The re-
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sult, according to one senior British official, is “strategic constipation,” as the interlinking of all issues
makes it impossible to resolve any single one.
RUSSIA—OTHER FACTORS
As noted earlier, the pure technical capabilities of
U.S. missile defense systems are not the only means
by which they pose a challenge to Russia. There are
a number of other historical and geopolitical considerations affecting Russian decisionmaking on BMD
that may not be intuitively obvious when the issue is
viewed from a U.S. perspective.
Self-Perception and Geopolitical Perspective.
Russian objections to BMD plans refer consistently
to threats to strategic stability. The shared understanding of this term as applied to deterrence during
the Cold War is no longer in force: to Western policymakers, it now has entirely different implications,
whereas in Russia, as with so much else, the definition
of the term has not moved on—leading to yet more
misunderstanding in bilateral discussion.76
One implication of this is that defensive systems
that could theoretically counter even a small part of
Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential have strategic
implications for Russia out of all proportion to their
actual degrading effect. As Paul Schulte notes in a 2013
paper, whether or not Russia’s deterrence can, in fact,
be neutralized by BMD, the fact that it is undermined
and called into question is in itself destabilizing.77
Allied to this is the Russian perception of nuclear
weapons as a guarantee, and indeed a symbol, of national status. In the first decade after the end of the

34

Soviet Union, the old quip comparing the country
with “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons” resurfaced
regularly among Russia-watchers.78 If nuclear weapons were all that stood between Russia and Third
World status, the implications of taking the weapons
away were clear enough. Regardless that Russia today is a very different country from that of the 1990s,
the status of nuclear weapons in the national psyche
remains the same. According to former U.S. diplomat
Wayne Merry:
Anything like BMD which contains the potential—or
even the perception of the potential—to compromise
the integrity or stature of the Russian nuclear arsenal
is seen by policymakers in Moscow as a danger not
only to the country’s security but to its historic identity as a great state.79

This contrasts with the approach taken in the United States and other states, which would happily renounce nuclear weapons altogether were such a thing
possible. Merry continues:
If all nuclear weapons were by magic to disappear
from the earth overnight, American security would
be enhanced due to our dominance in non-nuclear
military technologies and forces; by contrast, Russia
would face a fundamental crisis of national identity.
. . . Thus, American talk of global “nuclear zero” is
viewed in Moscow as inspired by the goal of U.S. nonnuclear hegemony, rather than to free the world from
nuclear fear.80

Another related issue is the inalienable Russian
perception that Russia matters in everything and
is constantly at the forefront of U.S. policymakers’
minds. While Rogozin may state that “European mis35

sile defence . . . can be created only with Russia’s participation. Without Russia, there will be no missile
defence,”81 this is hard to reconcile with the progress
of missile defense plans—without Russian participation—to date. In fact, Russia has very few levers with
which to influence U.S. decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the Russian urge to maintain a self-perceived superpower status, despite all economic, technical, and
military evidence to the contrary, leads it to seek to
use political constraints on the United States to compensate for its long-term relative decline. In essence,
diplomatic power is the only lever that Russia retains
to project power beyond its immediate neighbors.
Meanwhile, Russia believes that it can manage
through political relations those countries that the
United States perceives as a potential missile threat,
including Iran. Furthermore, Russia does not share the
U.S. threat perception; it does not believe Iran has the
intent, nor the capability, to engage the United States
with ballistic missiles.
Moscow questions U.S. published assessments of
Iranian missile technology but also points out that
since the United States clearly will not allow Iran
to develop a nuclear capability, it cannot logically
be concerned about a nuclear threat to Europe from
Iran. Therefore, the political effort and capital going
into EPAA must be designed for a more established
missile threat: Russia.
But even if Russia were to accept that a threat from
Iran exists, it is reluctant to legitimize U.S. efforts to
counter it today because of concerns—validated by
recent U.S. statements and actions—over how the
countermeasures will develop in the medium to long
term. In addition, domestic Russian politics need to
be considered. The current Russian leadership would
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find it challenging to emphasize the peaceable nature
of U.S. BMD plans after so much effort has been expended on portraying them as an existential threat
to Russia. A precedent for this challenge exists: Russian approval of Ulyanovsk as a site for a transit hub
on the Northern Distribution Network to facilitate
U.S., NATO, and allied drawdown from Afghanistan caused a severe domestic political backlash after
years of the Russian public absorbing largely hostile
messaging about NATO.82
One additional factor that is particularly unhelpful
in this context is the internal tension within the United
States, between the desire to present BMD as a credible system that will, in fact, deter its target audience,
and playing down its current and potential capabilities in order not to lend substance to Russian objections. The balance is not always well maintained: at
the same time Russia was being assured publicly that
ground-based interceptors to be sited in Poland could
not possibly challenge the Russian nuclear deterrent
because of their very limited number, statements were
also being made that “We will be able to put hundreds
of interceptors in the air at a given time . . . within the
next several years.”83
As put by Brigadier-General Lauri Kiianlinna,
“like beauty, a credible defence posture is in the eye of
the beholder.”84 It remains the case that both adversaries and unrelated third parties, including Russia, may
have more faith in the deterrent potential of missile
defense than its creators in the United States. Russia’s
military doctrine emphasizes the threat of hostile military infrastructure “approaching Russia’s borders,”
and it is easy, if desired, to read planned installations
in Poland and Romania, and Aegis BMD capabilities
afloat off the Russian coastline, as a case in point.85
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The perception is stronger in Russian minds than
in Western ones that missile defense is a reversal of
the post-Cold-War processes of the last 20 years: instead of disarming, withdrawing, and closing down,
this is an introduction of new capabilities. This is why
Russia points to a reversal of a security trend and a
shift in strategic balance.86 This exacerbates the Russian perception of the United States as an irresponsible actor that has not learned strategic lessons from
intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, and may
in the future be tempted to meddle in Russia. EPAA,
and expanded BMD capabilities in the Pacific, give rise
to a Russian sensation of encirclement by U.S. interceptor missiles and U.S.-sponsored forces in Europe,
the Middle East, and the Asia Pacific. In fact, a slide
repeatedly shown by Morgan showing global missile
defense deployments is eerily reminiscent of Soviet
propaganda images from the Cold War, showing Russia surrounded on all sides and across the Arctic by
missiles and troops fielded by the United States and
its imperialist proxies.
Economic Issues.
The suggestion that Russia’s strategic response
to SDI in the 1980s hastened the demise of the Soviet
Union has already been discussed. Thirty years later,
just as in the case of discussion of technical capabilities, informed Russian experts are perfectly prepared
to voice opinions that do not fall in with official policy,
warning of similar consequences that might ensue for
Russia from heavy investment in countermeasures to
defeat U.S. BMD plans:
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In principle, Russia is capable of taking these steps,
but it must consider the economic and political price
of doing so. This would mean huge spending on a
new arms race. In the case of the hypotonic Russian
economy, this is akin to a person with acute anaemia
donating blood. It is unlikely that we could cope with
this in the long run.87

This consideration is given extra weight by the
perception with hindsight that the Soviet response
to SDI was entirely unnecessary because SDI’s technological basis was, in fact, illusory. As put by Solomonov, speaking directly to Putin in February 2012,
“[SDI] tied up huge intellectual, material and financial
resources. . . . it was a complete fraud.” Speaking at
the same round table with Putin, Sergey Rogov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for
U.S. and Canadian Studies, continued that:
We are repeating the mistakes of 29 years ago. When
Reagan came up with “Star Wars,” some people in our
country decided that that was it, it was the end of the
world. . . . But now, in my opinion, there is a real opportunity to avoid past mistakes.88

Russia thus finds itself faced with a choice of existential threats: the U.S. BMD plans have the theoretical
potential either to devalue Russia’s nuclear deterrent,
its last-ditch guarantee of statehood and protection
of its interests, or to draw Russia into an arms race
whose previous iteration contributed to the downfall
of the state in which the current generation of Russian
leaders were born and raised—with all the dire consequences they observed at first-hand in the 1990s.
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Russia’s Proposed Responses.
Current Russian statements carry yet another echo
of past debates, only with the roles of the United States
and USSR reversed: when told that it is inconceivable
that the United States would consider a nuclear attack
on Russia, the Russian response is the same as that of
the United States during the Cold War—that a nation
cannot gamble its security on another state’s stated
intentions, but only on its developing capabilities.89
To Western ears, this sounds like Cold-War era thinking; but it needs to be placed in the context of Russia’s
perception of being both encircled and threatened by
the capability gap between the United States and Russia—perceptions that helped shape Soviet Cold War
thinking. This in turn provides context for the hostility of Russian statements and outright threats over
missile defense.
One of the most significant considerations informing Russian attitudes to BMD is the dramatic gap that
remains between Russian and U.S. military capability.
Russia’s perception of strategic vulnerability has led
to an emphasis on aerospace defense and strategic offensive weapons in the ongoing program of military
transformation and re-investment in defense in an attempt to close the gap—in spite of the warnings over
the consequences for Russia of a new arms race, and a
plethora of expert analysis observing that the real military threat to Russia is an entirely different one.90 The
detailed status and goals of the transformation effort
lie outside the scope of this monograph,91 but some of
the most recent adjustments at the time of this writing
place even greater weight on strategic weapons systems and relegate the ground forces still further in the
queue for funding.92 As put by Putin:
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We must take into account the realities of the day, we
cannot allow the strategic deterrence system to be upset or the effectiveness of our nuclear forces to be decreased. For this reason the creation of the aerospace
defense system will continue to be one of the key
priorities in military development.93

The new aerospace defense command (Voyennokosmicheskaya oborona or VKO) is being prioritized for
funding not only in response to the nuclear threat, but
also to a perception of vulnerability to U.S. conventional precision strike capabilities. Also, according to
Putin in June 2013, following the Presidential Summit
on the sidelines of the G8 Summit in the UK:
We see that work is active around the world on developing high-precision conventional weapons systems
that in their strike capabilities come close to strategic
nuclear weapons. Countries that have such weapons
substantially increase their offensive capability.94

But Russian reporting also suggests prioritization
of countermeasures specifically intended to overcome
U.S. BMD capabilities. According to Russian researcher Dr. Igor Sutyagin, Russia is investing heavily in a
range of means of both counteracting and defeating
U.S. BMD systems, which are “based on mature Soviet technology, just updating the electronics by two
generations.” These include penetration aids; advanced decoys; maneuverable and gliding re-entry
vehicles (RVs); concealment measures for RVs; means
for blinding infrared and radar seekers; nuclear force
protection measures, including road and rail mobile
ICBMs; seabed laid ballistic missile systems; and multilayered missile defense systems for Russia’s own
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fixed installations.95 As in other fields, Russian actions and statements now mirror those of the United
States in previous decades, in this case with the U.S.
response to the Moscow ABM site: it was reported to
the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that the
Soviet ABM system could be penetrated by ICBMs
equipped with highly effective chaff and decoys,
and furthermore that “if the Soviets should deploy
more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new
penetration aids as counters.”96
As part of the response to EPAA, Russia’s engagement with the new START has repeatedly been questioned. According to Rogozin, “At a certain stage a
situation could arise when we will have to leave the
START-3 treaty.”97 There is skepticism as to how realistic this threat may be. It had already been threatened
before the Sochi summit in 2011 that failure to fall in
with Russian requests for sectoral defense could lead
to Russia withdrawing from START98—a stipulation
that was then quietly dropped.
Official Russian statements send mixed messages
on where, and when, precisely Russia’s red lines lie.
On the one hand, Lavrov states that there are no deadlines for agreement,99 and Rogozin confirms that “in
general, we do not use the language of ultimatums.
One should learn to talk to the West with dignity and
from a position of confidence in our own powers.”100
On the other, there are plentiful statements and comments hinting at the unfortunate consequences of failure to reach an agreement satisfactory to Russia. In
2011, for example, Korchunov suggested:
I think in the case when we disagree and Russian concerns are not assuaged it could have unfortunate consequences for European security. These things should
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be regarded and perceived in a much broader context
of our relationship with the US—the interrelationship
between offensive and defensive arms is spelled out
in the Russia-US START Treaty. Of course if such an
unfortunate scenario develops it will force us to take
measures. The logic is simple and clear: if one side increases anti-ballistic capabilities it forces the other side
to build up its offensive arms.101

Finally, Russia has repeatedly threatened as a last
resort to take direct military action against U.S. facilities if its concerns are not heeded. As expressed in
one commentary in July 2011, if no legal guarantee is
received from the United States, Russia:
will deploy our missile grouping on the Western borders and aim our missiles at the European missile defence installations. . . . That will be the answer in any
case if they try to deprive us of the dearest thing that
any Russian has, our nuclear shield.102

The same threat has been repeated on numerous
occasions by Putin and Medvedev: as put by Medvedev in November 2011, Russia may “deploy modern
offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the
country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of
the US missile defence system in Europe.”103
OUTLOOK AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The recent history of the missile defense conversation with Russia has been one of repeated and unsuccessful attempts by the United States and NATO to
find an accommodation to allay Russian concerns. A
variety of approaches have been attempted in order
to convince Moscow that EPAA—as well as the larger
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concept of BMD overall—is not designed against or
intended to target Russia, nor its strategic deterrent.
Several initiatives were under way in 2012 alone, including a joint missile defense exercise in Germany,
and a report by the multinational Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative group.104 Yet none of these attempts
have mitigated Russia’s trenchant opposition to the
U.S. plans.
The ineluctable block to progress in discussions
of BMD between the United States and Russia is that
the two nations’ fundamental interests simply do not
align, and there is, therefore, no overlap at all between
the desired end states of each side. The United States
sees BMD capability as an essential means of protection for the United States and its allies; Russia sees the
exact reverse, and requires an absence of BMD systems from Europe to ensure its own security. There is
simply no room for compromise between these two
polar opposites. The best that U.S. policymakers can
do, therefore, is engage with the Russian fears in open
dialogue, in a continued attempt to assuage Russian
concerns and thereby avoid a political miscalculation
that could ultimately lead to a real military problem.
In the meantime, the United States should also
consider the messaging that is directed at its European
allies, as well as at Russia. It was widely recognized
that the 2013 news of cancellation of EPAA Phase IV,
while still unwelcome for Europe, was delivered in
a greatly more competent manner than the 2009 announcement of cancellation of earlier plans for installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Yet, private
diplomatic work with allied governments does not
always translate into European media treatment, or
public opinion, or expert commentary that is sympathetic to U.S. changes of plan. Even independent ex-
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perts from third countries may agree that the current
U.S. BMD plans are no challenge to Russia’s deterrent,
but at the same time remain highly critical of the handling of EPAA and its effects on U.S. allies. According
to Stefan Forss, “The U.S. did its allies a big disservice
putting so much political weight into SM-3 IIB. The
Poles and others feel betrayed. . . . Politics should be
based on facts, not technical illusions.”105
The experience of 2009 showed the importance
of public opinion in Central Europe and the amount
of political capital that allies potentially have to expend in order to be able to support U.S. plans. In this
area, the United States would benefit from enhanced
efforts to convince European publics that changes
of plan over EPAA do not mean a reduced commitment by the United States to European security. As
put by the Center for European Policy Analysis, a U.S.
think tank:
[The U.S.] Administration must now deal with the very
real fear among Europeans that last week’s EPAA cancellation was just the first in a series of “salami slices”
that, deliberately or not, will ultimately result in the
eventual, de facto death of the U.S. missile defense program in Europe. Rightly or wrongly, this has been the
suspicion of many Polish and American observers since
the onset of the Administration’s planning for EPAA.
. . . [By] removing the one component of America’s
BMD program in Europe that is directly relevant to the
defense of the continental United States, the cancellation is likely to create an irresistible opening for voices
on Capitol Hill to argue against the program entirely.
Under this logic, a system that only defends Europe
should no longer be America’s financial responsibility. Some allies are not irrational in their growing, if
politely muted, suspicion that greater “flexibility” on
BMD could indeed eventually enter into the cards in
strategic nuclear talks with Moscow.106
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Perception of U.S. commitment to Europe becomes
an even more acute issue in the light of U.S. statements
on a “pivot” to Asia. The subsequent rebranding of the
“pivot” to a “rebalancing,” among a number of other
soothing synonyms adopted by the U.S. leadership,
does little to address concerns over a possible reduction of the relative weight of the United States in European security107—which is, after all, a long-standing
Russian aim.108
The hostile messaging emanating from Russia is
an undeniable factor in Central European public opinion. But at the political level, working with Russia as
a dialogue partner in large part consists of the art of
filtering out angry noises and bluster in order to determine where the real concerns, red lines, and threats
of consequences actually lie. At the same time, just
because a Russian threat of direct military action in
Europe seems inconceivable to us does not mean that
it should be ruled out. Russian perception of military
action as a valid foreign policy tool was reinforced by
the results of the armed conflict in Georgia in 2008.
Although widely portrayed in foreign media and
analysis as self-defeating, and despite the fact that it
highlighted severe deficiencies in Russian military
capability, the conflict with Georgia, in fact, resolved
a number of key doctrinal challenges for Russia and
demonstrated that when Russia says often and loud
enough that it will do something, something does occasionally happen.109 It should be recalled that just as
in 2008, Russia would weigh the advantages and disadvantages of direct military intervention abroad to
protect its perceived security interests by very different criteria than would the United States.110
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One of the Russian responses to EPAA that has attracted the most attention overseas has been the threat
of deploying Russia’s own offensive missile systems,
specifically SS-26 Iskander missiles, to the Kaliningrad Region, thereby greatly extending their reach
into NATO territory.111 But it is misleading to link this
promise solely to EPAA. The threat of forward deployment of Iskanders has been a staple of Russian rhetoric
since long before 2009 and is reliably wheeled out in
many other cases when Russia feels it needs to make
a point because its interests are being neglected—for
example, ahead of the accession to NATO of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania in 2004. Previous instances even
pre-date the availability of Iskander systems; analogous threats of forward deployment of the Tochka-U
system date back at least to 2001.
Throughout this period, Russia has seen that its attention-seeking behavior has been richly rewarded by
strong reactions from European media and from those
policymaking establishments in partner countries that
have failed to retain the institutional memory to realize that the threat cannot in any way be described as
a new development. This confirms for Russia that repeated threats of deployments of advanced systems to
Kaliningrad are profitable and worthwhile, and they
should be expected to continue for as long as they
provoke the desired response. Nevertheless, as with
the case of deployment of S-400 Triumf systems to Kaliningrad, which was similarly preceded by a lengthy
series of threatening statements, they should also be
considered as indicative of a long-term rollout plan
by the Russian armed forces that eventually will be
implemented anyway.112
The United States can therefore expect Russia to
deploy weapons systems to counter U.S. missile de-
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fense, but the timing of this deployment, and the systems used, will most probably depend on the progress
of implementation of EPAA. Key dates in this respect
are the beginning of construction at the Romanian site
in September 2013 and at the Polish site in 2018. In addition, given the history of U.S. changes of plan linked
to changes in presidential administration, Russia may
be less inclined to seek a conclusive resolution before
the next U.S. presidential election in 2016.
Russia is faced with a choice between an early
agreement with the current U.S. President, that they
hope will be honored by the next incumbent, or the
much more realistic prospect of waiting for the 201618 window between the next U.S. election and the
beginning of construction at the Polish site. Ahead of
this time, Russia can wait to see what is offered by the
United States and then cherry-pick its preferred option; but after the start of construction in Poland, Russia loses political leverage, reducing the number of
alternative courses of action available by Russia other
than a purely military response. In this period, Russia could either accept U.S. or NATO offers of transparency and cooperation or make its own counteroffer of cooperation in an area that is important to the
United States.
As noted previously, Russian withdrawal from
the START appears unlikely. It is also questionable
whether renewed discussion by Russia of withdrawal
from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
would lead to action, given the extent to which the
treaty serves Russian interests by restraining an area
of U.S. conventional superiority.113 The Russian demands for “legally binding guarantees,” up to and
including a new treaty agreement, should be expected
to continue. But despite the lack of realism of the cur-
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rent phrasing of the Russian demands, another underlying factor that provides the United States with leverage is the validation a bilateral treaty with the United
States would provide for Russia’s self-perception as
a great power and the nominal equal of the United
States. The prospect of a treaty arrangement that recognizes the special role of the Russian Federation may
well provide a meaningful incentive in further discussions with Moscow, regardless of the actual eventual
content of any agreement reached.
Take It To The Top.
In an unscripted moment picked up by news cameras on March 26, 2012, President Obama told outgoing Russian President Medvedev that there is a better
chance of dealing with the sensitive issue of missile
defense after the U.S. presidential elections the following November. “This is my last election,” Obama
said. “After my election, I have more flexibility.” As
noted previously with the example of U.S. withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty, this direct leader engagement
on a personal level carries weight in discussions
with Russia.
Discussions on missile defense between Lavrov
and Rasmussen in April 2013 decided publicly to
“leave such a fundamental issue to the Presidents of
the Russian Federation and the United States.”114 Accordingly, the most recent initiative at the time of this
writing is a round of negotiations directly between
Obama and Putin, commencing with a letter from
Obama to Putin suggesting another way forward
on missile defense cooperation focused on transparency between the United States and Russia on BMD
technical capabilities.115 If any agreement at all can be
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reached with Russia on BMD, it is likely to be through
this bilateral presidential route; in any case, on the
Russian side, progress on a decision of this magnitude could not be made without authorization from
the very highest level. According to Foreign Minister
Lavrov, speaking ahead of the 2011 Sochi summit:
The subject of missile defence for obvious reasons can
hardly be tackled by the ambassadors. Deliberation on
it proceeds at the summit and high levels. There are
special arrangements, especially between Russia and
the United States.116

These “special arrangements” at present constitute
the only visible prospect for a resolution with Russia
before the next U.S. election cycle.
CONCLUSION
Viewed from Moscow, the history of U.S. BMD
development is one of inconsistency, unpredictability,
and doubtful assurances. Russia can have little confidence that this pattern will not continue. As put by
one NATO official, “US plans have changed twice in 4
years, and there are still 5 years to go till 2018.”117
According to a Russian official who requested anonymity, Russia’s key problem with EPAA is that the
United States says it is “a limited capability against a
limited threat, but then will not accept any limitations
on this so-called limited capability.”118 Indeed, at the
RUSI Missile Defence Conference in London, United
Kingdom (UK), in June 2013, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose felt the need to repeat three
times that the United States “cannot and will not” accept limitations on the capabilities of BMD systems.
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Thus, uncertainty over U.S. planning combines
with uncertainty over the ultimate technological capabilities of BMD systems to introduce a fundamental
element of unpredictability to Russia’s assessments
of its own security. A primary Russian concern, as repeatedly emphasized in the most recent iteration of
its Foreign Policy Concept, is the maintenance of “stability”;119 U.S. missile defense plans mount a direct
challenge to this aim.
Finally, any assessment of Russia’s future responses to further BMD developments must take into account the very different Russian perception of two
key issues: first, the role nuclear weapons play for the
state; and second, the role Russia plays in the world.
As put by Wayne Merry:
Ultimately, for Russia the issue is not Iran, nor NATO,
nor the US, nor specific systems. American progress
toward balancing ballistic missiles with credible defenses erodes the status quo essential to Moscow’s assertion of great power status. Far from seeing nuclear
weapons as a necessary evil of the modern world,
Russia’s elites perceive them as the bedrock of its state
power and global identity for the foreseeable future.
That is the starting point for any U.S. dialogue, let
alone negotiation, with Russia on BMD.120
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